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Abstract: Utilizing the power of local knowledge and peer networking, this study attempts to 
quantify the impacts of mentorship among female micro-entrepreneurs in Medellin, Colombia 
on empowerment. Developing countries such as Colombia have disproportionately high rates of 
unprofitable micro-businesses, many of which are managed by women. Internal constraints, such 
as disempowerment, play a central role in perpetuating poverty. We implement a 6-month 
mentoring intervention by pairing 18 successful entrepreneurs with 52 disadvantaged female, 
microentrepreneurs in Medellin, Colombia to measure the additional benefit of localized 
knowledge to micro-borrowers. Using a process of random assignment, I measure the change in 
female empowerment, measured by its impact on support, self-confidence, self-efficacy, locus of 
control, aspirations, and positivity among mentees. I use principal component analysis and 
ANCOVA analysis to measure the mentorship effect on these psychological well-being variables. 
I find that mentorship increases female empowerment by .71 deviations in the short-run. 
Treatment effects disappear in the long-run. Moderation analysis suggests that mentor-quality 















 Considering the prestige and honor we bestow upon entrepreneurs in highly developed 
countries such as the United States, it may be surprising to realize that most of the world’s 
countries report extremely high entrepreneurial rates, and there are well over 400 million 
entrepreneurs in the developing world (Wennekers et al., 2005).  Most of these people are also 
among the poorest on the planet (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011).  
 The urban subsistence labor force refers to individuals who identify themselves as self-
employed business owners, but whose businesses stagnant with low or negative profits, and 
zero growth (Cole & Fayissa, 1991). In contrast to entrepreneurs in developed countries, these 
micro-entrepreneurs do not have employees, work in the informal sector (usually from home) 
and are likely to be female (Carr & Tate, 2000). They work long, hard hours, yet are 
unproductive. They rarely expand their business and they subsist in poverty(Banerjee & Duflo, 
2011).  
 In an era where microfinance has expanded to even the most remote parts of the world, 
the problem of the unproductive micro-entrepreneur has remained a constant puzzle for 
researchers. Studies of micro-entrepreneurs with access to microfinance have consistently 
shown that increased availability to credit does not increase business profits. Why?  
 In Poor Economics, Banerjee and Duflo describe an “S” shaped business-growth model 
for micro-businesses. The marginal benefit of increasing investment is very high initially but 
tapers off quickly. To pass the hump and reach the next phase in business growth, a large 
investment would be needed. However, the amount needed is more than microfinance 
institutions are willing to give, or they charge interest rates that the poor cannot, or are not 
willing to pay. So, we see individuals invest little, earn little, and remain too poor to invest 
sufficiently in their business (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011).   
 Still an unsolved poverty trap, this study employs a new technique to stimulate small 
business growth in the developing, urban context of Medellin, Colombia, where urban 
subsistence labor is prevalent. We organize mentor meetings among female micro-
entrepreneurs in an RCT study to causally assess the impact of mentorship on profits and 
empowerment. We theorize that mentorship is transformative by facilitating specific, localized 
knowledge transmission through networks and creating business connections (Foster & 
Rosenzweig,1995). This study builds off of, and seeks to validate a 2017 RCT in Kenya, where 
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micro-entrepreneurs who received a mentor reported profits 20% higher than those who did 
not. (Brooks et al, 2017). Our study adds numerous psychological indicators to our assessment 
of mentorship because they provide critical insight to whether mentorship empowers and 
inspires female micro entrepreneurs to expand their business. We argue that female 
empowerment is an essential first step to business expansion, and consequently to increased 
profits and income. A lack of these subjective indicators may be a serious barrier to any poverty 
alleviation program. 
 
2. Literature Review  
2.1 An Elaboration of the Problem 
2.1.1 The Urban Subsistence Labor Force 
 Empirically, self-employment is much higher in developing countries than in developed 
countries, although self-employed individuals tend to subsist in poverty (Banerjee & Duflo, 
2011). A massive 100 country dataset created by Gindling and Newhouse shows that more than 
half of workers in low and middle-income countries are self-employed, compared to just 15% of 
high-income countries (Gindling & Newhouse, 2013). Moreover, Banerjee and Duflo find that 
44% of the urban poor are micro-entrepreneurs, compared to just 12% in OECD countries 
(Banerjee & Duflo, 2011). Cole and Fayissa first distinguish the poor, urban self-employed from 
other types of labor in 1991. They classify this labor as individuals with street vendors, or other 
micro-businesses that require little or no education or skills (Cole & Fayissa, 1991). These 
character traits, or lack thereof, are what Del Mel et al, argue distinguish profitable micro-
businesses from stagnant ones. They refer to the unproductive, unskilled microbusiness owners 
as “own-accord workers”. In an analysis of a Sri Lanka labor dataset, they show that between 
two-thirds and three-fourths of own-account workers have critical characteristics (such as 
ability, personality, and ambition) more similar to wage-workers than to entrepreneurs (Del 
Mel et al, 2008). Moreover, own-accord workers are likely to be less successful and poorer than 
both entrepreneurs and wage-workers (Gindling & Newhouse, 2013). 
  The fact that urban subsistence labor is characteristically very similar to wage labor, 
suggests that micro-entrepreneurs may become self-employed as a second-best option after 
being excluded from the wage-sector. Thus, in failing labor markets, we may see high micro-
entrepreneurial rates, but little business growth.  
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2.1.2 The Role of Gender on Self-Employment Outcomes 
 Due to long-standing perceived inequality of women in the workforce, women face 
barriers in entering formal labor markets. Notably, Ester Boserup argues that differential 
female labor participation is the result of gender norms as established by the divergence of 
female and male labor in the agricultural sector (Boserup, 1970). This theory was tested using 
data from the Food and Agriculture Organization and exploiting variation in the historical geo-
climatic sustainability of crops that require plow use in their cultivation. Results indicate that 
in countries with historical plow use, women are significantly less likely to participate in the 
workplace, in politics, or in entrepreneurial activities (Alesina et al, 2013). Thus, history and 
culture alone are enough to exclude women from the formal business sector.  
 However, the gap between female and male self-employment appears to be less 
pronounced in low and middle-income countries out of necessity of a source of income (Minniti, 
et al, 2010). Marlow explains this saying that patriarchal norms cause women to seek out self-
employment (Marow, 1997). Specifically, lack of upward career mobility and low wages may 
push women out of the formal job-sector (Marow, 1997).  Although women may be motivated 
into self-employment due to patriarchal norms in the workplace, business-support resources 
(such as funding) are disproportionately allocated to men. The SME Finance Forum finds that 
while women run 23% of small and medium sized businesses in developing countries, they 
account for 32% of the MSME finance gap (The SME Finance Forum, 2019 ) 
 This evidence points to an uncomfortable reality of female workers in developing 
countries; their labor may be misallocated, they are excluded from the wage-sector and pushed 
into self-employment out of necessity, and once there, they face additional marginalization in 
that male-dominated space. In this way, culture and institutions that perpetuate gender 
inequality add to the inefficiency of the female self-employed worker, who would be better off 
either as a wage-worker or as a more “successful” entrepreneur without facing gender 
discrimination constraints.  
 
2.1.3 Internal Constraints to Poverty 
 This experiment measures psychological indicators of self-efficacy, locus of control, self-
confidence, aspirations, and happiness due to recent literature that suggests poor psychological 
well-being may hinder success. Debraj Ray describes a self-sustaining poverty trap where low 
aspirations lead to the lack of productivity or goal reaching, which perpetuates poverty (Ray, 
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2006). Poverty then, limits individuals’ aspirations, creating the positive feedback loop that 
reinforces the poverty trap.  
 Moreover, Ray and Grenicot link aspirations to growth and inequality. They show that 
the larger state of the economy can determine individual level aspirations, which then affects 
the larger economic dynamic again (Grenicot & Ray, 2017).  Thus, poverty affects initial levels 
of aspirations, but the level of aspirations also determines larger economic outcomes. These 
findings suggest that one crucial key to any poverty alleviation strategy is lifting the internal 
constraints of poverty through motivation, goal-setting, or aspirational talks.  
 
2.1.4 The Many Failures Microfinance and Microfinance Plus  
 Keenly aware of the poor’s inaccessibility to credit in Bangladesh, professor Muhammad 
Yunis founded what is commonly believed to be the first microfinance organization, Grameen 
Bank, in 1976, as a research project. Its success initiated a microfinance craze that lasted for 
decades (Jain, 1996). Theory tells us that the introduction of credit markets allows poor people 
to invest in fertilizer, inventory, a sewing machine, employees, and many other things, making 
themselves better off in the long run. However, in the past decade, it has become clear that 
microfinance interventions have fallen short of initial expectations. J.D. Roth points out that 
access to credit only improves outcomes when other factors align together, such as 
infrastructure, goods markets, and investment in human capital (Roth, 1997). A microfinance 
institution in a particularly rural location with few roads and no marketplace will not induce 
farmers to grow and sell cash crops, for example (Roth, 1997). Moreover, microfinance has 
been accused of not helping the poorest of the poor, as Copestake et al. conclude in their study 
where borrowers of a single loan in Zambia were made worse off, due to rigid and unforgiving 
repayment schedules (Copestake et al, 2001). 
 Underwhelming standalone microfinance results led to the emergence of “microfinance 
plus,” the theory of supplementing a microfinance treatment to find more detectable impacts. 
The “plus” element of the treatment has frequently been business classes provided to micro-
lenders (De Mel & Woodroof, 2014; Bali Swain et al, 2010). Swain et al, hypothesize that Indian 
households don’t understand how to effectively use the loans they receive, leading them to 
randomize business training among a subset of micro-lenders. Results showed training induced 
asset accumulation but had no effect on income (Bali Swain et al, 2010). Randomly assigned 
business training to a Peruvian group lending program for female micro-entrepreneurs also 
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had no statistical impact on sales, employment, or household financial decision-making (Karlan 
& Valdivia, 2011). Both studies echo the larger disappointing literature on business training. A 
large-scale business class program called “Start-and-improve Your Business” has been 
replicated in many settings throughout the developing world, but shows classes have no impact 
on profits (De Mel & Woodruff, 2014; Blattman & Ralston, 2015).  
 
2.2 The Facets of Mentorship and Why it Works 
2.2.1 Mentorship as an Internal Constraint Lifting Tool 
 Making use of the information cascades mentors provide, and by interacting with an 
individual who has a successful business, mentors can act as role models, and lift mentees’ 
internal barriers, which are often caused and reinforced by their poverty. For example, 
impoverished individuals tend to be risk-adverse and have high discount rates, which certainty 
would hinder entrepreneurial success where risk and investment in the future are important. 
On risk aversion specifically, researchers from Princeton point out that the poor choose 
habitual, rather than goal-directed behaviors, which stifles productivity. They theorize that this 
initiates a positive feedback loop where risk-adverse behavior causes poverty, and poverty 
reinforces risk-aversion (Haushofer & Fehr, 2014).  
 Mentorship interventions work to dismantle the positive feedback loop for own accord 
workers, whose poverty-induced mentality is the main contributor to their firm’s 
unproductiveness. Taking on a role model position, mentors can help their mentees improve 
the very traits necessary for business success, namely locus of control and self-efficacy. A study 
indeed finds that parent entrepreneurial role models were associated with increased education, 
aspirations, self-efficacy, and expectation for an entrepreneurial career among mentees (Scherer 
et al, 1989). 
 
2.2.2. The Role of Locus of Control and Self-Efficacy on Entrepreneurial Outcomes 
 To effectively lift internal constraints among micro-entrepreneurs (in this case through 
mentorship,) it is important to focus on psychological traits that are indicative of 
entrepreneurial success, such as self-efficacy and locus of control. Using various tests and 
survey questions, an individual’s locus of control and self-efficacy can be ascertained, and these 
can be used as indicators for entrepreneurial success, or as Lucas calls it, managerial 
technology.  
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  The concept of self-efficacy was theorized by Albert Bandura in 1977. He describes it as 
the belief in oneself to successfully execute a behavior of interest (Bandura, 1977). Moreover, 
Bandura highlights the importance of one’s perceived self-efficacy, which influences activities 
and expectations of eventual success, and therefore may be even more important than actual 
self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977). Using lab participants, he experimentally proves his theory and 
shows that self-efficacy is positively related with successful execution of a task (Bandura, 1977). 
This result indicates that a person’s perception of ability affects actual ability when performing 
an action. Thus, self-efficacy is an important quality for self-employed workers because level of 
self-efficacy can motivate or de-motive productivity. Extending Bandura’s concept to this 
context, we can theorize that self-employed workers with low levels of self-efficacy lack the 
confidence necessary for a successful enterprise. This could also explain why own-accord 
workers in the informal sector tend to have low productivity, with no business expansion, and 
also reaffirms De Mel et al’s result that own-accord workers lack key characteristics successful 
entrepreneurs have.  
A second psychological concept critical to entrepreneurial success, is the notion of locus 
of control. One’s locus of control refers to their perception of how much control they exert over 
outcomes (Rotter, 2004). Based on their perception, individuals are classified as either internal 
or external, referring to whether they view control as an internal or external force (Rotter, 
2004). Business and management literature cite locus of control as an indicator of 
entrepreneurial success (Furnham, 1986; Adekunle, 2011). Particularly, being identified as 
having internal locus of control is an indicator of entrepreneurialism (Howell & Avolio, 1993). 
 Another way to think about locus of control is to think about the role individuals believe 
luck plays in their lives. Alesina and Giuliano argue that individuals from various cultural 
backgrounds can observe the same reality but conclude differently about the role of luck in 
success (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015). While they focused on why different people have different 
attitudes about the hard work vs. luck debate about success, what is important in this paper is 
that workers view the source of their success differently. It has been argued that 
entrepreneurial-minded people believe hard work is the source of success, and thus, have a 
diligent work ethic (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015). We can imagine some self-employed workers 
with an external locus of control, that is to say, who perceive luck to have a large role in their 
success, as having a more hands-off approach to their business growth.  
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2.2.3 Mentors as Information-Updating Devices 
 We can refer to the transfer of knowledge from a successful business owner to a micro-
entrepreneur as mentorship, and we can think of mentors as information updating tools for 
own-account workers who lack the ability to expand or change their business in way that 
would make it more successful. 
 While never applied to a developing context or to micro-entrepreneurs, the impacts of 
general business mentorship are well documented. A 1979 study argued that mentorship 
increases work effectiveness, and found that about two-thirds of all observed, distinguished 
American executives had mentors. These executives earned more money at a younger age and 
reported being happier in their careers compared to their counterparts who did not have 
mentors (Roche 1979).  The theory of mentorship was most famously developed by Christopher 
Orpen, who argues that interactions between organizational agents (read: mentors) and 
employees creates perceptions that they are cared about, making the individual want to succeed 
for sake of the mentor. (Orpen, 1997). Further, Scandura finds that mentor-relationships in a 
manufacturing plant was positively related to promotion rate and salary rate, even after 
controlling for several mentee characteristics (Scandura, 1992). Several recent studies list a 
host of benefits of mentorship. For example, in a female focused e-mentoring intervention, 
researchers found that the intervention positively influences mentees attitudes towards facing 
uncertainty, flexibility and innovation (Kyrgidou & Petridou, 2013).  
 The well-theorized and empirically proven results of mentorship may stem from the fact 
that own-account labor work inefficiently due to a lack of business-updating. Mentors 
introduce new business (and culturally) specific information, which essentially acts as a 
technology introduction for the mentee. Interestingly, anthropologists have discovered that 
human behavior changes not from environmental learning alone, but rather with a combination 
of environmental stimuli and cultural transmission (Hendrich, 2001). This theory can be 
translated to mentorship, where own-account workers do not react to outside market forces 
alone (ie: a changing customer base); rather they need a mentor to act as a cultural agent to 
pass along updated information.  
 
2.2.4 The Role of Social Learning in Entrepreneurial Success 
 The information passed from mentor to mentee is an example of social learning.  Social 
learning is the process of learning through information cascades and through one’s social 
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network. Numerous studies have shown how social learning can impact economic outcomes, 
such as a 1995 study by Foster and Rosenzweig that shows the adoption of high yield variety 
seeds induce learning spillovers among Indian farmers (Foster & Rosenweig, 1995). Farmers 
are more likely to adopt the new seed if their neighbors have adopted it, and farmers with 
neighbors experienced with the new technology were more profitable than farmers who had 
inexperienced neighbors (Foster & Rosenweig, 1995). Thus, simple information transmission 
by neighbors can increase the adoption of a new farm technology and move all players in this 
stag-hunt game to the pareto optimal outcome due to more productive farm technology. 
 Similarly, Conley and Urdy demonstrate the social learning process of pineapple 
adoption in Ghana. In this 2-year study, results showed that farmers adjusted their inputs to 
align with their neighbors who were successful at growing pineapples in the previous period 
(Conley & Urdy, 2010). Furthermore, their results indicated that inexperienced farmers were 
the most responsive to the neighbors who had adopted the pineapple, providing more evidence 
of learning (Conley & Urdy, 2010). 
 
3. Data and Experiment 
3.1 Experimental Design 
We implement a mentorship program experiment similar to one developed by Brooks et 
al in their 2017 paper “Mentors or Teachers? Microenterprise Training in Kenya”. Since our 
experiment differs in location and sample size, and since we have additional outcomes of 
interest, we modify the basic design for our needs.  
We promote the mentor program to female microentrepreneurs through a microfinance 
organization and a local, government sponsored entrepreneurial program. Women who meet 
our participation criteria are invited to reunions throughout the city, where the experiment is 
explained, and baseline data is collected. We additionally recruit potential mentors through 
microfinance organizations, present the project as a community leadership position, and 
conduct baseline surveys.  
 
3.2 Randomization 
 The experiment involves half of the microentrepreneurs to randomly become “mentees,” 
who are assigned to treatment, and half who become the control group. We use a pairwise 
matching technique during the randomization process to ensure a balanced sample. Individuals 
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were grouped first by the location from which we conducted their baseline survey. Then, they 
were further grouped by type of business (clothing, food, personal services, general store, 
artesian crafts, imitation jewelry, and other,) and years of experience in their current business 
(where we first binned individuals with 0-2.9 years of experience together, and 2.9-5 years of 
experience together). Finally, if a further criterion was needed to make a pair, we grouped 
individuals with the most similar business type together (for example, baker with baker, shirt-
maker with shirt-maker).  Once we obtain a pair of two microentrepreneurs with the same or 
most similar covariates, we divide the pair into pile A and pile B. We do this for all individuals 
for a given location, so randomization occurs within each survey location. We flip a coin to 
assign treatment to either pile A or pile B. A graphic of the randomization process is included 
in the appendix. 
 
3.3 Treatment Description 
 Three to five treatment mentees are grouped together by business type and location and 
then assigned with the geographically closest mentor with the same business type. Mentees 
meet with their assigned group once a week for five weeks, then once a month for five months, 
so the treatment spans six months and entails ten meetings. A follow up survey is completed by 
everyone after the completion of the weekly meetings. A second wave survey is completed 
following the end of all ten meetings. A final survey is completed 6 months after the treatment 
ends, and one year after the experiment commenced. Mentors follow a mentor curriculum 
developed by Professor of Economics, Bruce Wydick, which is included in the appendix. 
Mentors and mentees cover business topics such as accounting and managing an employee, and 
internal psychological struggles including goal-setting, and conceptualizing pathways out of 
poverty. However, organic conversation and need-specified deviations from the curriculum are 
highly encouraged.  
 Mentees are paid a transportation stipend of 5,000 Colombian pesos (COP) for each 
meeting they attend, paid only after the completion of the meetings. Both treatment and 
control are paid 10,000 COP for their time completing the surveys and invited to participate in 
a one-hour accounting course where they receive an accounting notebook. We do not suspect 
this class to impact the experimental results, since research indicates that business courses 
targeted to micro-entrepreneurs have no impacts (De Mel & Woodruff, 2014; Blattman & 
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Ralston, 2015). Moreover, the class meets only once for one hour. Mentors are paid a stipend of 
$120,00 COP for their participation and to cover any transportation costs. 
  
3.4 Location  
We conduct the one-year mentorship experiment in Medellin, Colombia, beginning in 
June of 2018. We choose a Latin American context because of the high female micro-
entrepreneurial rate. Colombia has a steadily decreasing poverty rate, which is currently 26.9%, 
and has an urban poverty rate of 8.7%, as of 2017 (World Bank Data, 2018). Increased 
development and commerce makes Colombia a promising candidate for poverty alleviation 
targeted towards the marginally poor (such as the mentorship program).  
Since Medellin is Colombia’s second-largest city and sprawls across the Aburrá valley, 
we have significant challenges in connecting micro-entrepreneurs both with each other and 
with mentors. For this reason, we work in several distinct locations in the city, as well as a 
municipality called Itagui, which is a suburb of Medellin. As a result, our full sample is actually 
composed of two groups: the Medellin group, whom we obtain from our connection with the 
microfinancier Banco de los Pobres, and the Itagui group, whom we obtain from a 
governmental entrepreneurial program in Itagui.  It is possible that these groups differ in 
unobserved ways, so we complete our analysis on the full sample, as well as by group. 
 
3.5 Participants 
We have strict participation criteria. Treatment candidates must be female, an 
entrepreneur, have less than 5 years of experience in their current business venture, and come 
from a social strata of 3 or below. For this last criterion we take advantage of Colombia’s class 
stratification, which varies between 1-6, with 6 being the highest, and is assigned based on an 
extensive governmental household survey. Our mentors also must be female entrepreneurs, and 
additionally, they must have 5 or more years of experience in their current business, and come 
from a strata of 3 or above. There is a small number of individuals who participate, but who 
violated some portion of the participation criteria.  
 
4. Hypothesis and Model 
Our experiment is composed of two components: intermediate and final outcomes. This 
study focuses on the intermediate outcomes of mentorship on female empowerment through its 
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impact on support, self-confidence, self-efficacy, locus of control, aspirations and positivity, 
while my colleagues estimate the impact on long-term outcomes indicated by business sales and 
profits. Intermediate and final outcomes interact in a positive feedback loop initiated by weekly 
mentoring sessions of mentors and mentees of a particular industry. We theorize that 
mentorship causes information cascades from mentor to mentee, leading to more effective 
business practices, increased empowerment, and finally, higher sales and profits. Increased sales 
and profits then lead to even higher levels of hope and bigger aspirations.  
 
4.1 Econometric Model 
This experiment seeks to capture the impact of peer-mentoring among micro-
entrepreneurs in Medellin, Colombia. The question of interest is whether 5 weekly, and 5 
monthly peer mentor sessions affect female empowerment through impacts on support, self-
confidence, self-efficacy, locus of control, aspirations, and positivity. We assume the null 
hypothesis where mentorship has no impact on any of our subjective indicators. Formally, 
H0: β = 0      (1) 
The alternative hypothesis is that mentorship has an impact on female empowerment 
through its impacts on support, self-confidence, self-efficacy, locus of control, aspirations, and 
positivity where 
    HA: β≠ 0                 (2) 
 To test our hypothesis, we estimate the equation: 
 
 Yijt = α + β1Ti1 +	β2Ti2 + ηXi + fBi +gWi2 + jYi0+ sMi +qPj	+εijt                       (3) 
 
Where the outcome variable Yit is an indexed outcome variable of female empowerment, 
support, self-confidence, self-efficacy, locus of control, aspirations, and positivity, for individual i 
at time t where t = {0,1,6} months since the treatment began. The outcome variables represent 
standard deviation changes from the mean response, where the mean and standard deviation are 
standardized. Ti1 is an interaction term of t=1 and treatment. I interpret the coefficient on this 
variable as the impact of mentorship after one-month. Similarly, Ti2 is an interaction that 
indicates treatment at t=6 months. This variable yields the impact of mentorship after six-
months. Xi is a vector of individual characteristics, measured at baseline. I also include a dummy 
variable Bi, that switches to 1 if the group is from Medellin, and 0 if it is from Itagui. W2 is an 
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indicator for the second follow-up survey at t=1 month. I use baseline values of the outcome 
variables as right-hand side regressors, represented by Ui1. An indicator for missing baseline 
outcome values are captured by Mi.  Finally, I use a pair-level fixed effect, drawn from the pairs 
created during randomization and containing time-invariant characteristics. I cluster εit at the 
mentor group level, since outcomes are likely correlated at this level.  Since control individuals 
do not have a mentor group, groups were artificially constructed by location and business type, 
as this is how a mentor group was determined for treatment participants.  
I interpret the program impact as the impact of assignment to the treatment group, 
therefore following an intent to treat strategy. This may lead to a downward bias in estimation 
since non-compliance among the treatment group was high.  
 
4.2 Estimation Technique  
 The random assignment of a mentor allows causal estimation of the treatment as it 
ensures treatment and control are balanced on both observable and unobservable 
characteristics. For this to be true, I rely on the following assumptions: the independence of 
individual observations, normality of the distribution, and heteroskedasticity. I use statistical 
tests to verify these assumptions in my dataset. Moreover, since the data is in a panel and 
attrition did occur, I assume that observations are missing at random. The failure of this 
assumption implies biased coefficients, although the direction of the bias would depend on 
which observations were missing non-randomly. For example, if attrition among treated 
individuals who did not participate in the program is statistically significant, I would expect the 
treatment effect to be biased upwards.   
 
4.2.1  ANCOVA Estimation  
 Equation (3) is an ANCOVA estimation technique. This estimation strategy is chosen 
because it reduces variances and therefore increases the ability to reject a null hypothesis by 
including baseline values of the dependent variable (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).  Moreover, in 
randomized studies where treatment is assigned at baseline, the literature indicates that 
ANCOVA is unbiased and has higher power than other estimators (Van Breukelen, 2006). 
Additionally, I prefer the ANCOVA estimation because it requires no additional assumptions 
beyond those mentioned in section 4.2. 
 
 14 
4.3 Main Variable Construction 
Outcome variables are mean-zero, standardized principle components of survey 
questions. Principle component analysis is a data-reduction tool that emphasizes strongly 
correlated data. As a result, highly variable data can be compressed, highlighting the over-
arching pattern in the data (Jolliffe, 2011). In this dataset, the principle components find 
correlations between each set of survey questions and weighs the questions accordingly. All of 
the survey question responses were a number between one and five (where one signifies 
“strongly disagree” and 5 signifies “strongly agree”).  Questions that were asked in the negative 
and require reverse-scoring were likewise reversed in the component. The support, self-
confidence, self-efficacy, locus of control, aspirations, and positivity components were composed 
of 3-4 survey questions. The female empowerment component was constructed from all the 
survey questions in the aforementioned components. 
 
 
4.4 Alternative Variable Construction 
An alternative data-reduction tool is the construction of summary indices, such as 
Anderson or Kling indices.  In many ways, Anderson indices reduce information in an opposite 
way than principle component analysis. The Anderson index weighs down highly correlated 
data through its use of the inverse of the covariance matrix, therefore preserving variability and 
eliminating redundancy (Anderson, 2008). As a result, the Anderson index serves as the perfect 
robustness check to the original variable construction. Indices are mean-zero and standardized, 
and individual questions are reversed-scored when necessary. 
Conversely, the female empowerment summary index is constructed following Kling, 
2007. I assume that the components of this index, self-confidence, self-efficacy, locus of control, 
aspirations, positivity, and support should have equal weight, as opposed to the disproportional 
weights assigned with Anderson indices.   
 
5. Results 
5.1 Summary Statistics 
 Our final sample consists of 107 female micro-entrepreneurs, 55 from the Medellin 
group (henceforth referred to as Banco de los Pobres group), and 52 from Itagui. In terms of 
demographics, the average woman in our sample is 40.01 years old, has 10.91 years of 
education, and has a social strata of 2.1. 35.9% of our sample considers themselves food 
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insecure. On average, a woman’s business is 2.13 years old, participants work 4.95 days a week, 
8.57 hours a day, and earn 201,821 COP ($65.16) a week. 52.88% of our sample report they use 
accounting in the management of their business. Overall, the sample is modestly educated, 
marginally poor, and follow a relatively normal work schedule. All relevant micro-entrepreneur 
summary statistics are provided in table 1.  
 Our mentor sample consists of 9 mentors for the Banco de los Pobres group, and 9 
mentors for the Itagui group, totaling 18 in all. The mentor sample skews older than the 
mentee sample, with the average age being 50.2. Mentors are also more educated than mentees, 
with an average of 13.6 years. The average strata is 3.2, making them solidly middle-class in 
Colombian society. They are highly experienced in business management (15.22 years of 
experience) and have 2.3 employees on average.  
 
5.2 Balance Tests 
 I perform ttests to check for balance of treatment and control after randomization. 
Testing on the key variables, age, education, strata, experience, age of business, type of 
business, profits and sales (with log transformations,) indicate that the groups are balanced at 
baseline (Table 2 ). Since I suspect that the Banco de los Pobres group may differ from the 
Itagui group, I perform balance tests on the same key variables by group. The results indicate 
that the groups are distinct in several ways, including level of education, business age, strata, 
and business type. I add a dummy variable called “banco” to control for these discrepancies in 
regression analysis.  
 
5.3 Main Results with PCA Variables 
 Table 3 reports ANCOVA regression results of all seven outcome variables on 
treatment. An analysis of the correlation between survey questions show that 3 questions are 
oppositely correlated in their component and  in their alternative index variable construction. I 
remove these survey questions from their respective component and all further analyses 
because of this discrepancy.   
 The one-month results show the treatment was highly effective in increasing female-
empowerment and its components (Figure 1). Receiving a mentor increases a woman’s 
empowerment by .71 standard deviations from the mean score, (2.5 out of 5) and it is highly 
significant. Moreover, treatment significantly increases support, self-confidence and aspirations 
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by .68, .51, and .57 standard deviations, respectively. All other variables yield positive 
coefficients yet remain statistically insignificant. 
 Row two of table 3 reveals the six-month treatment effect on each outcome variable. 
The strong effect of mentorship in the short-run mostly disappears, as all variables loss 
significance at conventional levels and the magnitude of the coefficients diminish across all 
variables (Figure 2). However, all outcome variables maintain positive coefficients. This 
suggests that a small positive effect has remained, but is statistically undetectable given the 
sample size.  
 
6. Moderation Analysis  
 Given positive and encouraging results, I would like to understand if there is a 
moderator through which mentorship works. It is of interest to identify which facet of the 
program drove increases in outcome variables, so this program can be replicated in other 
contexts with the expectation of similar results. In this section I add the outcomes business 
revenue and business profits to my analysis. 
 Since mentors are highly variable, I hypothesize that mentor quality is a main channel 
to the observed treatment effect. A preliminary analysis of difference in log profit from baseline 
by mentor-group shows a few outlier groups (3, 13, 15, & 19) with a large positive difference in 
profit from baseline (Figure 5). These mentor-group numbers correspond with mentors from 
Itagui. A scatterplot of difference in empowerment from baseline by group also indicates a 
heterogeneous treatment effect with outliers of large, positive differences in empowerment 
coming from Itagui (Figure 10). 
 
6.1 Mentor Quality by Group 
 I hypothesize that mentors we sourced from the Camera de Comercio in Itagui are 
higher quality mentors than mentors from Banco de los Pobres. To understand this 
relationship, I construct a kling mentor-quality index using variables such as business 
experience, profits, and number of employees. Each mentor then ascertains a quality score as a 
mentor.  
 A scatterplot of mentor-quality by group shows that Itagui mentors have higher 
mentor-quality scores than Banco de los Pobres mentors (Figure 6). Moreover, a plot of 
mentor-quality and mentee revenue of just the Itagui group shows a strong positive 
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relationship (Figure 7). Similarly, there is positive relationship between Itagui mentor-quality 
and both profits and female-empowerment (Figures 8 & 9). 
 
6.2 Mentor Quality Regressions 
 I run a regression of mentor-quality on mentee revenue, profits, empowerment, support, 
self-confidence, and aspirations. This subset of outcomes are chosen because I suspect them to 
be the most likely affected by mentor quality. Formally, I estimate: 
   Yijt = α + β1Ti1 + ηXi + fBi + jYi0+ sMi +εijt                                     (4) 
 Where Yit are the outcome variables log revenue, log profit, and female-empowerment, 
support, self-confidence, and aspirations. Ti1 is a mentor-quality index for mentor i at baseline. 
Using log interpretations of revenue and profit allows for an intuitive percent-change 
coefficient interpretation on these variables. The remaining variables are defined as in (3). I use 
robust standard errors because the number of clusters is small (N=19), and clustered standard 
errors would be biased downward, increasing the likelihood of type I error.  
  A casual interpretation of this analysis hinges on the assumption that mentor-quality 
was randomly assigned among mentees. Indeed, the match of a mentor to a mentee group was 
made solely on business type and location. If mentor-quality is correlated with these 
characteristics, the assumption fails. Moreover, the regression applies to only a small subset of 
the original sample (since control and baseline observations are omitted,) which further 
complicates casual inference.  
 
6.2.1 Mentor Quality Regressions 
 Table 5 reports ANCOVA regression using (4). Log profits and log revenue are 
statistically significant when regressed on mentor quality. A one-standard deviation increase in 
mentor-quality increases profits by 32% and revenue by 40%. The subjective indicators yield 
small, positive coefficients; however, none are statistically significant at conventional levels due 
to large standard errors and a small sample size. These results provide solid evidence that the 
mentor program is successful at increasing revenue and profits among participants with a high-
quality mentor. It is interesting that the coefficient on empowerment is lower in this regression 
analysis than in (3). One interpretation of this result is that participants are empowered not 
only by their mentor, but by the peers in their mentor-group. Perhaps it is this peer-based 
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support group that drive the strong increase in female empowerment in table 4.  Unfortunately, 
I cannot capture the peer-group effect with the mentor-quality index. 
  
7. Robustness Checks 
7.1 Main Results with Indexed Variables 
 Initial results with Anderson index variables show that treatment has a prolonged 
effect, even at the 6-month follow up, contrasting the 6-month results found using PCA 
variables. However, this discrepancy can be explained by the negative correlation between 3 
survey questions and the index they pertain to. I believe these questions may not have 
accurately measured the desired indicator because they were abstract, out of context, and 
poorly translated into Spanish. When these questions are removed from their respective 
indices, results are generally conformable to those found in table 3. 
 Table 4 reports ANCOVA regression results using the alternative variable construction 
method with 3 survey questions omitted. One-month treatment effects are nearly identical in 
magnitude and statistical significance across all outcomes (Figure 3). Assignment to a mentor 
increases female-empowerment by .77 standard deviation and remains highly significant. 
Support and self-confidence also show a strong positive short-term effect of mentorship. 
 Six-month treatment effects indicate mentorship’s effectiveness diminishes in the long-
run, but not as much as indicated in table 3 (Figure 4). The magnitude and significance of 
outcome variables largely decrease from one-month levels. Notably, empowerment continues to 
yield a large and significant positive coefficient, as does self-confidence in the 6-month follow-
up.  
 The few discrepancies between PCA variables and Anderson index variables in the six-
month regression may be due to their contrasting data-reduction processes. However, 
coefficient signs and magnitudes follow similar trends, and I interpret this to mean regression 
results are robust to alternative variable construction. 
 
7.2 Random Inference  
 While treatment was assigned individually, treated outcomes are likely correlated since 
treated participants met with other treated participants in their assigned mentor-group. Thus, 
all regressions used clustered standard errors at the mentor-group level, which were artificially 
constructed based on location and business type for control participants. However, the number 
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of actual treated mentor-group clusters remains small (N=19). A small number of clusters may 
artificially decrease standard errors and result in type 1 error. Random inference resamples the 
treatment variable 1000 times while respecting the clustered nature of the data. This procedure 
ensures that the clusters themselves are not driving outcomes. I run random inference 
regressions on all seven PCA-constructed outcomes of interest. All treatment coefficients are 
similar in magnitude and standard errors to those in tables 3 and 4.  
 
8. Conclusion 
 This paper investigates the causal relationship between mentorship and female-
empowerment, as measured by support, self-confidence, self-efficacy, locus of control, 
aspirations, and positivity. To examine this relationship, we implemented a six-month 
randomized experiment among female micro-entrepreneurs in Medellin, Colombia. Using an 
ANCOVA model, I find significant short-run gains in empowerment, as well as support, self-
confidence, and aspirations. Results all but disappear by the 6th month and the conclusion of the 
experiment.  
 Moderation analysis suggests that mentorship is most effective when participants are 
paired with high-quality mentors. Regression of outcomes on mentor-quality indicate revenue 
and profit are strongly correlated with mentor-quality. There are also appears to be a small, 
positive correlation between mentor quality and the subjective outcomes: female empowerment, 
self-confidence, aspirations and support. The analysis also uncovered that Itagui mentors were 
of higher-quality than those from banco de los pobres. To this point, there is a  stronger, 
positive relationship between Itagui mentor quality and Itagui mentee revenue, profit and 
empowerment, then in the full sample. It appears that the program was more effective in this 
subset of the sample, however the relationship between mentor-quality and outcomes is 
endogenous so I am cautious in making this claim. Perhaps the omitted variable in this 
equation is location; Itagui has higher-quality mentors, but it may also have higher-quality 
mentees, and their quality may be correlated with the fact they are from Itagui.  
 Taken together, results suggest that mentorship can be a powerful tool in empowering 
women and alleviating poverty. Yet, much like micro-finance, it appears that mentorship 
requires a variety of factors to interact in order to be effective. Policy-makers should consider 
the frequency of mentor-meetings, program length, and mentor-quality when implementing a 
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mentorship program. This analysis suggests a high-frequency, long-lasting mentoring 
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     Appendix 
 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
  
              Total Sample         Banco          Itagui 
        
Age                 40.01                 40.89           39.08 
                      (11.20)               (11.35)         (11.06)    
    
Education        10.91                   9.25            12.66    
                      (3.29)                 (3.10)           (2.50)    
    
Strata              2.10                    1.67              2.56    
                     (0.73)                  (0.58)           (0.57)    
    
Lrevenue        12.49                   12.60           12.38    
                     (1.33)                  (1.38)           (1.28)    
    
Lprofit           11.58                   11.63            11.53    
                     (1.57)                  (1.73)            (1.40)    
    
Experience      5.55                    5.87               5.20    
                     (6.45)                 (6.51)             (6.43)    
    
Business age    2.13                  2.47                1.78    
                     (1.47)                 (1.59)             (1.26)    
    
Days                 4.97                 5.53                4.36    
                       (2.13)              (1.86)              (2.26)    
    
Hours                8.54                9.55                7.42    
                       (3.14)              (2.43)              (3.48)    
        
N                     107              55              52    
        
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses  








         Table 2: Balance Test 
                Treatment                        Group                 
                        b               t            b               t 
Age              -0.10       -0.75     -1.15         -0.87 
Education    -0.20       -0.53     3.08***     9.20 
Strata            0.07        0.73    0.89***     12.46 
Experience    0.03        0.05   -0.31           -0.42 
Business age  0.14       0.60    -0.73***    -3.09 
Businesstype -0.04      -0.20    2.20***     14.10 
Lnrevenue      0.07       0.47    -0.15          -1.05 
Lnprofit          0.12       0.74    -0.07          -0.40 
































Table 3: ANCOVA Regression with PCA Variables 
 






Control Aspirations Positivity Empowerment 
        
Treatment_1mo 0.68*** 0.72*** 0.22 0.12 0.45* 0.14 0.71*** 
 (0.17) (0.22) (0.23) (0.15) (0.26) (0.18) (0.19) 
        
Treatment_6mo 0.35* 0.12 0.06 0.24 0.34* 0.28 0.32* 
 (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20) (0.18) 
        
Follow_up2 0.29 0.35 0.46* 0.22 0.50** 0.00 0.49** 
 (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.16) (0.20) (0.25) (0.23) 
        
Age 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Strata 0.46* 0.41** -0.10 0.08 -0.21 0.28* 0.25* 
 (0.24) (0.19) (0.22) (0.19) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) 
        
Banco 0.81 1.38** 0.03 -0.16 -0.09 -0.02 0.84 
 (0.64) (0.67) (1.27) (0.43) (0.46) (0.45) (0.46) 
        
_cons -1.51* -1.69** -0.30 -0.25 0.48 -0.75 -1.21** 
 (0.87) (0.77) (0.79) (0.67) (0.63) (0.52) (0.54) 
                
Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Baseline Value Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                
N 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 
Notes: All values rounded to second decimal point. Standard errors are clustered at the mentor-group level.  














   Table 4: ANCOVA Regression with Indexed Variables 




Control Aspirations Positivity Empowerment 
        
Treatment_1mo 0.69*** 0.69*** 0.16 0.12 0.46* 0.31* 0.77*** 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.24) (0.15) (0.27) (0.18) (0.19) 
        
Treatment_6mo 0.45** 0.27 0.05 0.24 0.35* 0.34 0.51** 
 (0.22) (0.19) (0.26) (0.18) (0.20) (0.23) (0.23) 
        
Follow_up2 0.21 0.26 0.44* 0.22 0.47* 0.05 0.52* 
 (0.21) (0.20) (0.27) (0.16) (0.25) (0.21) (0.27) 
        
Age 0.01 0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Strata 0.51* 0.51** -0.01 0.09 -0.22 0.28*** 0.50*** 
 (0.28) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.17) (0.12) (0.17) 
        
Banco 0.73 1.82*** -0.39 -0.17 -0.14 0.39 1.12 
 (0.67) (0.64) (1.37) (0.43) (0.49) (0.50) (0.70) 
        
_cons -1.66* -2.16*** -0.41 -0.25 0.51 -0.75 -1.93*** 
 (0.99) (0.79) (0.79) (0.66) (0.65) (0.60) (0.55) 
                
Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Baseline Value Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 
Notes: All values rounded to second decimal point. Standard errors are clustered at the mentor-group level. Female empowerment is 
constructed as a Kling index. All other variables are Anderson indices. 



































































                         Figure 3: ANCOVA 1-month Results with Indices 
 











































































































































Figure 10: Scatterplot of Difference in Empowerment and Mentor-group 
 
 




















                       Table 5: Mediation Analysis Regression with Robust SE 
 
       
  Profit Revenue Empowerment Support 
Self 
Confidence Aspirations 
       
Mentor Quality 
Index 0.32* 0.40*** 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.19 
 (0.18) (0.12) (0.18) (0.13) (0.11) (0.16) 
       
Banco 0.48 0.45 0.33 0.61** 0.21 0.40 
 (0.42) (0.29) (0.35) (0.30) (0.32) (0.29) 
       
Strata -0.16 -0.32** 0.04 0.12 0.05 0.01 
 (0.18) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) 
       
_cons 8.92*** 8.57*** 0.24 -0.06 -0.05 0.06 
 (0.97) (1.36) (0.42) (0.45) (0.42) (0.37) 
              
N 70 74 81 81 81 81 
All values rounded to the second decimal place. Robust standard errors are used. 
* p<.10     ** p<.05     *** p<.01    
 
 
